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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 20001145-CA

SANTIAGO ACOSTA-TORRES,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

:

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, State of Utah entered judgment of conviction for Child Abuse, a
second degree felony, on December 15, 2000. R. 109. See Judgment in Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. PRESERVATION
Issue. The presentence investigator indicated that Appellant/Defendant Santiago
Acosta-Torres ("Appellant" or "Santiago") would have been an appropriate candidate for
probation, but because the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") planned to
deport Santiago, the investigator recommended prison. Although the state recommended
probation with jail followed by deportation, the trial judge was "not of the view that the
recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate" (R. 167:7) and sentenced Santiago to
prison. The issue in this case is whether the trial judge abused his discretion and violated

due process, equal protection and the Supremacy Clause in sentencing Appellant to prison
based on a recommendation of prison time because INS planned to deport Appellant.
Preservation. This issue was preserved when defense counsel questioned the
propriety of the prison recommendation and requested that if the trial judge were inclined
to impose prison, defense counsel be allowed additional time to discuss the
recommendation with the presentence investigator. R. 167:3-4. The trial court proceeded
with sentencing and imposed a prison sentence. R. 167:109-10. Alternatively, even if
this Court determines that the issue was not preserved below, Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e)
gives this Court authority to correct this sentence, which was imposed in an illegal
manner. State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 856, 859 (Utah 1995); see discussion infra at 20-21.
Standard of Review. A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Patience. 944 P.2d 381, 389 (Utah App. 1997). A trial court's
discretion is not unlimited, however, and must be exercised so as to comply with
constitutional requirements. See generally id. (trial court's discretion must be exercised
so as to comply with due process and requirements of procedural fairness) (citing inter
alia State v. Sweat. 722 P.2d 746, 746 (Utah 1986)). The underlying constitutional issues
are questions of law which are reviewed for correctness. State v. Arviso. 1999 UT App
381, TJ5, n.4, 993 P.2d 894 ("[Constitutional questions . . . are questions of law and
therefore reviewed for correctness11).
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TEXT OF DETERMINATIVE RULE AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The text of the following rule and constitutional provisions are in Addendum B:
Utah R.Crim. P. 22(e);
Due Process Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Equal Protection Clause, Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution;
Supremacy Clause, Article VI, clause 2, United States Constitution.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state charged Defendant/Appellant Santiago Acosta-Torres ("Appellant" or
"Santiago") with one count of child abuse, a second degree felony, in an Information filed
July 13, 2000. On November 13, 2000, Appellant pled guilty as charged in the
Information. R. 82-89. On December 15, 2000, the trial judge sentenced Appellant to
prison. R. 108. On December 23, 2000, trial counsel filed a notice of appeal. R. 111.
The office of appellate counsel was appointed to represent Appellant on January 31,
2001. R. 126.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This case has not gone to trial. As part of his guilty plea, Appellant admitted that
he intentionally caused serious bodily injury in the form of two or more injuries, to A.Z.,
a child under seventeen, by squeezing him. R. 166:7-8.
According to the presentence report, three-month-old A.Z. was brought to the
hospital emergency room on June 22,2000, by his mother, Breanne Heath, Appellant,
and two other people. PSR:2. The baby had several bruises on his face, some trails that
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could have been caused by finger marks from slapping, a swollen and bruised left ear, a
partial palm print over the ear, bruising over his eyes, and finger type bruises on the left
hip. PSR:2.
The emergency room doctor did not believe that the injuries were consistent with
the mother's explanation of how they occurred. PSR:2. Officers talked with the four
people who had brought the baby into the hospital and were given various explanations
for the baby's injuries. PSR.2. Ultimately, the officers learned that the baby was left
alone with Santiago while the others went to the store. PSR:3; 165:5-6. When Breanne
and the others left, A.Z. did not have any bruises or injuries. PH:6. After they returned,
A.Z. was crying and they discovered the marks and bruises. R. 165:7.
While being questioned by police officers, Santiago became upset and admitted
that he had dropped the child. PSR:3. After Santiago dropped A.Z., the baby would not
stop crying. PSR:3. According to the presentence report, Santiago told officers that in an
effort to make the child stop crying, Santiago "'flicked' the baby on the side of his head
with his finger approximately two times.ff PSR:3. He then acknowledged that he had
"flicked" the child two to six times. PSR:3.
A.Z. did not suffer any injuries other than bruising. R. 165:12. The bruising was
not a long term injury, A.Z. did not suffer any permanent injuries, and A.Z. was doing
very well at the time the presentence report was prepared. PSR:5.
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Santiago was nineteen at the time of the crime. PSR: 1. He was born in Mexico,
but moved here with his family when he was twelve. PSR: 11. He is married and has a
daughter who was 22 months at the time of this incident. PSR: 12. Santiago left high
school in the eleventh grade because he needed to support his wife and daughter.
PSR: 12. He had worked at the same job for a year and a half and made $ 1500 a month
when he was arrested. PSR: 14.
Santiago had a number of juvenile referrals. PSR: 15. "His biggest problem as a
juvenile, he ran away from home, so they ended up putting him in a proctor home, and
he'd keep coming back to Court on that regard." R. 167:6. He had one adult conviction
for misdemeanor assault. PSR: 15.
The arresting officer reported that Santiago was not cooperative during the
investigation of this case, but acknowledged that "in the 'grand scheme9 this is not the
worse child abuse case." PSR:7. The officer recommended that Santiago serve at least a
year in jail. PSR:7.
After thoroughly reviewing Santiago's background and the circumstances of the
crime, the presentence investigator thought that Santiago was "an appropriate candidate
for probation after a lengthy period of jail," but recommended prison solely because INS
planned to deport Santiago. PSR: 16. The state recommended that Santiago serve a year
in jail, followed by deportation. R. 167:5.
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Defense counsel challenged the propriety of sentencing a defendant to prison
instead of probation because INS planned to deport the individual. R. 167:3-4.
The trial judge sentenced Santiago to prison, then stated:
Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not of the view that the recommendation from
AP&P is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone that would beat up on a child of
this nature, in my estimation, really needs some serious thinking time, and I
am concerned that you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again and
endanger some other innocent victim out in society.
R. 167:7.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Imposing a harsher sentence based in part on a defendant's status as an illegal alien
violates the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution. States have no role or interest
in immigration matters, including matters related to the exclusion of illegal aliens. By
concerning himself with whether INS intended to deport Santiago in determining the
appropriate sentence, the trial judge overstepped into forbidden federal territory, in
violation of the Supremacy Clause.
The trial court also violated due process by imposing a harsher sentence based in
part on Santiago's purported status as an illegal alien. Such a consideration is improper
for sentencing purposes and therefore violates the due process requirement that
sentencing decisions be based on relevant, reliable and appropriate factors.
Imposition of a harsher sentence based in part on a defendant's purported status as
an illegal alien likewise violates equal protection. Regardless of whether an intermediate
6

scrutiny or rational basis test is applied, the action fails because the state has no interest or
role in the exclusion or immigration status of individuals. Since the state has no interest,
imposition of a harsher sentence based on an individual's purported status as an illegal
alien is not related to either a legitimate or substantial state interest.
This issue was preserved below when defense counsel challenged the propriety of
a recommendation for a harsher sentence based solely on Santiago's purported status as
an illegal alien, and the trial court indicated that such a recommendation was not
inappropriate. Even if the issue was not preserved, however, this Court can vacate this
illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e).
Finally, this case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing in order
to preserve the appearance that justice and fairness were served in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT. THE TRIAL JUDGE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING APPELLANT TO PRISON BASED IN PART ON HIS
IMMIGRATION STATUS.
The presentence investigator and prosecutor thought that a jail sentence rather than
imprisonment was the appropriate sentence in this case. Nevertheless, the presentence
investigator recommended prison based solely on the fact that INS planned to deport
Santiago. Although defense counsel challenged this recommendation, Judge Frederick
did not believe the recommendation was inappropriate and sentenced Santiago to prison.
In imposing a harsher sentence based at least in part on Santiago's purported status as an
7

illegal alien, the trial court violated equal protection, due process and the Supremacy
Clause, thereby abusing his discretion in sentencing.
A. IMPOSING A HARSHER SENTENCE ON THE BASIS OF THE
DEFENDANT'S PURPORTED STATUS AS AN ILLEGAL ALIEN
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION, DUE PROCESS AND THE
SUPREMACY CLAUSE.
1. The Sentence Violates the Supremacy Clause.
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, art. VI, cl. 2, dictates that
federal law controls the exclusion and entry of aliens into the United States. Arviso, 1999
UT App 381,1HJ5-7. "Congress has delegated authority to the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to determine whether aliens may enter [or must be deported
from] the United States, thus designating this area of the law for federal control and
preempting state participation." Id. at ^f5.
In Arviso, this Court concluded that the trial court violated the Supremacy Clause,
thereby abusing its discretion, when it suspended Arviso's prison sentence based "'on
condition [he] not return to the United States.5" Id. at ^[7. This Court reasoned that M[b]y
imposing this condition, the trial court trespassed into forbidden INS territory, violating
the Supremacy Clause." Id at ^7.
"The Supreme Court 'has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over"
the admission of aliens.'" State v. Pando, 122 N.M. 167, 921 P.2d 1285,
1287 (App. 1996) (quoting Fiallo v. Bell. 430 U.S. 787, 792, 97 S.Ct. 1473,
1478, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977) (citation omitted); see also State v. Camargo.
112 Ariz. 50, 537 P.2d 920, 922 (1975) ("The federal power over aliens is
8

exclusive and supreme in matters of their deportation and entry into the
United States."); Hernandez v. State. 613 S.W.2d 287, 289-90 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1980) ("The passage of laws which concern the admission of citizens
and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to Congress, and not to
the States.'" (Citation omitted.)).
Arviso, 1999 UT App. 381, Tf6. Hence, "a court exceeds its discretion when sentencing
'a criminal defendant in such a manner as to assume the power to control the . . .
exclusion of aliens.'" IcL (citation omitted).
Basing a recommendation for prison solely on Appellant's status as an alien and
the purported plan of the INS to deport him trampled on "forbidden INS territory."
Arviso. 1999 UT App 381, Tf7. Imposing a prison sentence based in part on a belief that
INS planned to deport Santiago likewise involves a consideration which is not relevant to
state court action. See id. The federal government, through the INS, is exclusively
responsible for deportation matters, and states may not play a role in deciding whether an
individual is deportable or otherwise involve themselves in deportation matters. Id at
1ffl5-7. In a case such as the present one, where INS may have identified an individual as
an alien and indicated a plan to deport that individual, the actual procedure for
deportation is left in the hands of INS. Basing a sentence in a state case on a belief that
the INS plans to deport the individual improperly steps into the federal immigration
arena, thereby violating the Supremacy Clause.1
1

As set forth more fully infra at 12-15, when the record demonstrates an
appearance that the sentencing was based at least in part on an unconstitutional
consideration, the sentence must be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing. See
9

2. The Sentence Violates Due Process.
The state and federal due process clauses "require [] that a sentencing judge act on
reasonably reliable and relevant information in exercising discretion in fixing sentence."
State v. HowelL 707 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 1985): State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064, 1071
(Utah 1993). In other words, a "judge may not consider improper, inaccurate or mistaken
information, nor may he make unfounded assumptions or groundless inferences in
imposing sentence." United States v. Borrero-Isaza. 887 F.2d 1349, 1352 (9th Cir. 1989).
A sentence which is based on improper information violates due process and must be
vacated. See Johnson, 856 P.2d at 1071-75 (vacating sentence which was based on an
unreliable hearsay report).
A due process violation occurs when a judge sentences a defendant more harshly
based on his status as an alien. See Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1352 (citing inter alia
United States v. Gomez, 797 F.2d 417, 419 (7th Cir. 1986) for the proposition that
"sentencing defendant more harshly because of his nationality 'obviously would be
unconstitutional'"); United States v. Onwuemene, 933 F.2d 650, 651 (8th Cir. 1991)
(consideration at sentencing of defendant's status as an alien violates due process);
Martinez v. State, 961 P.2d 143,145 (Nev. 1998) (considering defendant's nationality or
ethnicity in imposing sentence violates due process); United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577,
e.g. United States v. Leung, 40 F.3d 577, 586-87 (2d Cir. 1994) (vacating sentence where
record created appearance that defendant's alien status had played a role in determining
sentence).
10

586-87 (2d Cir. 1994) (due process violated where defendant's alien status or nationality
plays a role in sentencing).
In Gomez, the Court recognized that illegal aliens are protected under federal due
process and equal protection. Gomez. 797 F.2d at 419 (citing Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S.
202,210-16 (1982); Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1986)). The Court also
recognized that consideration at sentencing of a defendant's status as an illegal alien
could violate those protections. Gomez. 797 F.2d at 419.
Due process and equal protection were not violated in Gomez, however, because
the defendant's status as an illegal alien was tied to the crime. Id at 420. Gomez, who
was from Columbia, illegally entered the United States and was subsequently convicted
of drug distribution. Id at 418-19. In his sentencing comments, the judge indicated that
he "did not mean to suggest that Mr. Gomez or people similarly situated be treated more
harshly because of their nationality or alien status, that would obviously be
unconstitutional." Id at 418 n. 2. The judge went on to say, however, that because of the
economic rewards for people from Columbia who distribute illegal drugs in the United
States and the increasing numbers of people from Latin America who are distributing
drugs, it was important to impose a strong sentence not only for the crime, but as a
possible deterrent. Id.
The Seventh Circuit recognized that "[i]f misused those considerations [of
Gomez's status as an illegal alien from a Latin American country with an illegal drug
11

reputation] could violate the constitutional protections to which aliens, including illegal
aliens, are entitled under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 419. Nevertheless,
the court held that the judge did not abuse his discretion in sentencing because "[t]he
nationality of Gomez, and his illegal entry and entrance into the illicit drug business, are
too related to be artificially separated for sentencing purposes." Id. at 420.
The Ninth Circuit in Borrero-Isaza clarified that while a focus on the source
country may be appropriate for sentencing in some cases, a focus on the defendant's
national origin or alien status is never appropriate. Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1355-56.
Because the sentencing judge "partially based the sentence on Borrero's national origin,"
the sentence violated due process and was vacated. Id. at 1355.
In the present case, the presentence investigator recommended prison based solely
on Santiago's status as an illegal alien. PSR:16. Santiago's status did not relate to the
underlying crime; the rationale of Gomez that consideration of the source country can be
an appropriate factor in sentencing in a drug case therefore does not apply to this case.
The recommendation of a harsher sentence because the defendant is purportedly an illegal
alien violated due process in this case where that status was not linked to the crime.
Although defense counsel challenged the propriety of sentencing Santiago more
harshly based on his immigration status (R. 167:4), Judge Frederick nevertheless appears
to have sentenced Santiago at least in part based on his status as an illegal alien. Despite
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the recommendation of the state that Santiago not be imprisoned, Judge Frederick
sentenced Santiago to prison, then stated:
Mr. Acosta-Torres, I am not of the view that the recommendation
from AP&P is inappropriate. Indeed, anyone that would beat up on a child
of this nature, in my estimation, really needs some serious thinking time,
and I am concerned that you might allow yourself to fly off the handle again
and endanger some other innocent out in society.
I'm therefore of the view, Mr. Acosta-Torres, that you ought to be
committed to the Utah State Prison, and I'll order that be accomplished
forthwith.
R. 167:7-8.
While the follow-up sentences suggest that the prison sentence was based in part
on the nature of the crime, the judge's initial sentence explicitly states that the AP&P
recommendation was not inappropriate. Since defense counsel had just addressed the
impropriety of this recommendation, the trial judge's statement that the recommendation
was not inappropriate should be taken at face value as a determination that basing the
sentence on Santiago's status as an illegal alien is acceptable. Moreover, because the
presentence investigator's recommendation is based solely on Santiago's status as an
illegal alien, the judge's acceptance of that recommendation necessarily encompasses a
determination that the recommendation, including the basis for the recommendation, is
sound.
In addition, the remainder of the information relevant to sentencing weighs heavily
in favor of probation with jail rather than a prison sentence. The prosecutor
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recommended jail rather than prison, and the presentence investigator indicated that but
for Santiago's status as an alien, probation with a jail sentence, not prison, would have
been recommended. Although Judge Frederick indicated that the circumstances of the
crime also figured into his sentence, the circumstances of this crime, while unpleasant, do
not rise to an egregious level calling for a prison sentence of one to fifteen years. In fact,
the investigating officer recognized that "in the 'grand scheme5 this is not the worse child
abuse case; however, if a prison sentence is not imposed, the defendant should at least
serve one year in jail.1' PSR:7. The record as a whole therefore demonstrates that the
improper consideration of Santiago's immigration status played a role in sentencing.
Where the record creates at least an appearance that the sentencing judge partially
based his decision on the defendant's status as an alien, due process is violated, requiring
that the sentence be vacated and a new sentencing hearing be held. See Leung, 40 F.3d at
586-87 (vacating sentence where "appearance of justice" was not satisfied since record
created the appearance that defendant's "ethnicity and alienage status played a role in
determining her sentence"); Borrero-Isaza. 887 F.2d at 1355 (vacating sentence on due
process grounds after pointing out, "[a]fter a careful review of the record, we are left with
the overriding impression that the district court partially based sentence on Borrero's
national origin"); Onwuemene. 933 F.2d at 652 (vacating sentence on constitutional
grounds where one of the factors relied on by the sentencing judge was the defendant's
status as an alien, stating "[b]ecause we cannot say that the district court would have
14

imposed the same sentence absent this impermissible consideration, we must vacate
Onwuemene's sentence and remand for resentencing"); Martinez. 961 P.2d at 145-46
(vacating sentence on due process grounds where there was an appearance that the judge
improperly relied on the defendant's alienage in imposing sentence, even though the court
could not determine from the record that the judge actually relied on that improper
factor); see generally Johnson. 856 P.2d at 1074 (vacating sentence and remanding for
resentencing where one of the factors considered by the judge at sentencing was improper
and violated due process). In this case where the record creates at least the appearance
that the trial judge relied at least in part on Santiago's status as an alien in imposing
sentence, due process was violated.
3. The Sentence Violates Equal Protection.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects ff[a]liens, even
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful." Plyler v. Doe. 457 U.S, 202, 210
(1982); see also Gomez. 797 F.2d at 419. That Clause requires that laws be applied
equally to all persons regardless of their alienage. Kalbali v. State. 636 P.2d 369, 370
(Okla. Crim. App. 1981) (quoting Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n.. 334 U.S. 410
(1948)).
Courts apply three levels of scrutiny when analyzing whether state action violates
equal protection. First, when a suspect classification or fundamental right is involved,
courts employ a strict scrutiny test. State. Dept. of Revenue v. Cosio. 858 P.2d 621, 626
15

(Alaska 1993). Pursuant to the strict scrutiny test, the state must demonstrate that the
state action is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Plyler. 457 U.S. at
217. Second, when "quasi-suspect" classifications are involved, courts employ an
intermediate scrutiny test under which the government must show that the state action
bears a substantial relationship to an important governmental interest. Id. at 218; Cosio,
858 P.2d at 626 (citation omitted). Third, all other classifications are reviewed under a
rational basis test. IcL Pursuant to the rational basis test, the state must demonstrate that
the challenged action is rationally related to achieving a legitimate state interest.
Without clarifying the level of scrutiny being applied, the court held in Kalbali that
"the refusal of the trial court to consider granting a defendant a deferred or suspended
sentence, solely because he is a foreign national, is a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and invidiously
discriminates between an alien and a citizen." Kalbali, 636 P.2d at 371.
Shortly after the decision in Kalbali, the United States Supreme Court applied an
intermediate scrutiny test in assessing whether a statute which allowed school districts to
deny enrollment to children who were illegal aliens and withheld funds for educating
such children violated Equal Protection. Plyler. 457 U.S. at 224. The Court held that the
state failed to show that denying children who are illegally in the United States a free
public education was justified by a substantial state interest. Id. at 230. The statute
therefore violated equal protection.
16

Some equal protection decisions following Plyler have suggested that the use of
the intermediate scrutiny test in cases involving illegal aliens might be limited to
circumstances similar to those in Plyler where state action interferes with the access by
children to education. See e.g. Cosio, 858 P.2d at 627. For example, in Cosio, the court
stated:
Plyler indicates that the Court's increased scrutiny cannot be
attributed solely to the fact that the challenged law burdened illegal aliens.
Rather, the Court offered two important reasons for subjecting the Texas
law to higher scrutiny:
[(1) The state law] imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of
children not accountable for their disabling status. [(2)] The stigma of
illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying these
children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the
structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that
they will contribute in even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation.
Cosio. 858 P.2d at 627 (quoting Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223). While increased scrutiny is
undoubtedly required when assessing whether state action precludes access by illegal
aliens to education, preserving the due process rights of illegal aliens and providing them
with a fair proceeding before depriving them of their freedom is an equally important
reason for requiring intermediate scrutiny. Just as depriving children of education creates
a lifetime hardship and stigma, sentencing someone to prison who would otherwise be
placed on probation creates lifelong impact and a stigma. Accordingly, intermediate
scrutiny as employed in Plyler should apply in this case. Even if intermediate scrutiny
were not applied, however, equal protection requires at the very least that the trial court's
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action in sentencing Santiago more harshly based on his status as an illegal alien be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Regardless of whether the intermediate scrutiny or rational basis test is applied,
sentencing Santiago to prison based on his status as an illegal alien violates equal
protection because it does not serve a state interest, substantial or otherwise.
As set forth in Point A(l), authority to determine whether aliens must be deported
rests with INS, and state action violates the Supremacy Clause when the state involves
itself in immigration matters. See generally Arviso, 1999 UT App 381, TJ6 (state has no
role in deportation matters). Accordingly, the state has no interest in deportation matters.
When a judge sentences a defendant more harshly because EMS plans to deport him, the
judge bases the sentencing decision on a matter in which the state has no interest. Such a
basis for sentencing a defendant therefore is not related to a state interest, let alone a
substantial state interest. Because the state action was not related to a state interest, it
violated equal protection.
In this case where the presentence investigator recommended a harsher sentence
based on Santiago's status as an illegal alien, and the record demonstrates at least the
appearance that Judge Frederick sentenced Santiago to prison based in part on his status
as an illegal alien (see discussion supra at 12-15), the sentence must be vacated and the
case remanded for a new sentencing hearing.

18

B. THIS ISSUE WAS PRESERVED FOR REVIEW; ALTERNATIVELY,
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 22(e) ALLOWS THIS COURT TO REVIEW THE
ISSUE.
This issue was preserved for appellate review when defense counsel questioned the
propriety of the recommendation that Santiago be sentenced to prison because INS
wanted to deport him. Defense counsel stated in part:
Defense counsel: Two sentences of that. "It should be noted the defendant
would be considered an appropriate candidate for probation after a lengthy
jail period or a period of jail. However, this agency's options now are
limited, knowing that INS plans on deporting the defendant,11 and then they
recommend prison.
I'm extremely bothered by it and I attempted to call the person that did this
report, Stacy Smith, but she's out of the office until the 18th. I do know the
State's planning on recommending a year in jail in this case, and I think that
would be an appropriate resolution.
If the Court is strongly leaning towards prison, then I'd ask for some more
time to at least talk to the officer and get to the bottom of it. I think it's not
a very good report in that regard.
R. 167:4. Defense counsel's statement informed the sentencing judge that defense
counsel believed Santiago's immigration status was an improper factor for the judge to
consider in sentencing. While defense counsel did not state that sentencing Santiago
more harshly on this basis violates the Supremacy Clause, due process or equal
protection, counsel nevertheless sufficiently informed the court that this factor was not
appropriate. Moreover, the trial court's statement that it was "not of the view that the
recommendation from AP&P is inappropriate" suggests that the trial court understood
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that defense counsel was arguing that this factor could not be considered for sentencing,
but disagreed. Since defense counsel raised the issue and the judge ruled on it, the claims
raised on appeal were adequately preserved for review.
Alternatively, even if the claims were not preserved, this Court can correct the
illegal sentence pursuant to Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e). Utah R. Crim. P. 22(e) states, ,f[t]he
court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any
time.M In Brooks. 908 P.2d at 859, the Supreme Court recognized that pursuant to
Rule 22(e), an appellate court can vacate an illegal sentence even if the claim is raised for
the first time on appeal. Id. at 860. The Court stated:
When a sentence is patently illegal, an appellate court can vacate the illegal
sentence without first remanding the case to the trial court, even if the
matter was never raised before. This makes theoretical sense because an
illegal sentence is void and, like issues of jurisdiction, should be raisable at
any time. This view of the matter is also supported by considerations of
judicial economy.
Brooks. 908 P.2d at 860. In this case, the sentence is patently illegal as set forth above.
Rule 22(e) allows this Court to review this issue and vacate the sentence even if it
determines that the issue was not preserved below.2
2

The challenge to the sentence made in this case could also be reviewed under the
doctrines of plain error or exceptional circumstances. Plain error occurs where ll6(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful.'" State v. Adams. 2000 UT App 42, %L09 5 P.3d 642 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993)). An error occurred in this case since imposition of a
harsher sentence based on Santiago's status as an illegal alien violates the Supremacy
Clause, due process and equal protection. The error should have been obvious in light of
Arviso since Arviso clarified that state courts have no role or interest in the deportation of
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C. THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED TO A DIFFERENT JUDGE
FOR RESENTENCING.
Because of the nature of the violation and the necessity of the appearance of
justice, some courts that have vacated a sentence which was improperly based on the
defendant's status as an alien have remanded the case for resentencing before a different
judge. See e ^ Leung. 40 F.3d at 587; Martinez. 961 P.2d at 146; Kalball 636 P.2d at
371. The rationale for remanding the case to another judge for resentencing is that "the
appearance of justice is better satisfied by assigning the resentencing to a different judge."
Leung. 40 F.3d at 587. This concern for the appearance of justice requires reassignment
for resentencing even when the appellate court nbelieve[s] the District Judge could fairly
sentence on remand." Id.: see also Martinez, 961 P.2d at 146 (because court "[could] not
conclusively determine that the district court did not improperly rely on prejudicial
matters/1 the case was remanded for resentencing before a different judge.) In this case,
aliens. Moreover, the trial court should have known pursuant to Johnson and other case
law that due process requires that sentence be based on reliable, relevant and appropriate
factors. The error was harmful since Santiago was sentenced to prison even though
probation with jail appeared to be the more appropriate sentence.
The doctrine of exceptional circumstances "serves as a 'safety device' to assure
that 'manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal.'"
State v. Irwin. 924 P.2d 5, 8 (Utah App. 1996) (citation omitted). Exceptional
circumstances is a much less precise doctrine than plain error, "as it is a descriptive term
used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that even though an issue was not
raised below and even though the plain error doctrine does not apply, unique procedural
circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the issue on appeal." Id.
In this case where defense counsel alerted the trial judge to a concern with imposing a
harsher sentence based on deportation status and an illegal sentence is in place, manifest
injustice would occur if this Court were to refuse to review the issue.
21

"the appearance of justice is better satisfied by assigning the resentencing to a different
judge" where the record demonstrates that the trial judge imposed a harsher sentence
based at least in part on Santiago's status as an illegal alien. See Leung, 40 F.3d at 587.
While it would be appropriate to remand this case to a different judge based solely
on a concern for satisfying the appearance of justice, some courts also consider additional
factors. In Borrero-Isaza, the court outlined "factors to be considered in deciding whether
resentencing should be conducted by a different judge." Borrero-Isaza, 887 F.2d at 1357.
Those factors are:
(1) the difficulties, if any, that the district court would have at being
objective upon remand because of prior information received; (2) whether
reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and (3)
whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication of effort out of
proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of justice.
Id. Applying these factors, the court in Borrero-Isaza decided that the case did not
require reassignment primarily because a new court "would have to review the
voluminous pleadings and testimony in this case and make its own factual findings. This
would entail substantial waste and duplication of effort out of proportion to any gain in
preserving the appearance of justice." Id
A different result is reached in this case where application of the three factors
demonstrates that the case should be remanded to a different judge for resentencing.
Unlike Borrero-Isaza, this case does not involve "voluminous pleadings and testimony."
Id. The district court record is very short. Moreover, the case did not involve a trial
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since Santiago entered a guilty plea. At the plea hearing, the judge merely read the scant
details of the crime which were included in the plea affidavit. R. 166:7-8. A new judge
could simply read the plea affidavit and presentence report and be in the same position for
resentencing as the original judge. Given the passage of time, the original judge would in
all likelihood also have to review these documents prior to resentencing. Remanding the
case to a new judge therefore would not require substantial waste or a duplication of
efforts. Given the appearance that justice is not being served which would be created by
remanding to the same judge, and the minimal effort required by a new judge to
familiarize himself or herself with the information pertinent to sentencing, the BorreroIsaza factors weigh in favor of remanding the case to a different judge for resentencing.
In order to preserve the appearance that Santiago received a fair and appropriate
sentencing in this case, Appellant respectfully requests that this case be remanded to a
different judge for resentencing.
CONCLUSION
Appellant/Defendant Santiago Acosta-Torres respectfully requests that this Court
vacate his sentence and remand the case for resentencing with a different judge.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //-tt day of June, 2001.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001912118 FS

SANTIAGO A. ACOSTA-TORRES,
Defendant.
Custody: Oxbow Jail

Judge:
Date:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
December 15, 2000

6,0. *aH05q4
PRESENT

Clerk:
cindyb
Prosecutor: HIGGINS, TRINA A
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : BUIVIDAS, ALAN J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: April 8, 1981
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 9:58-10:06
CHARGES
1. CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 11/13/2000 {Guilty Plea}
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of CHILD ABUSE/NEGLECT a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.

Page 1

Kn

Case No: 001912118
Date:
Dec 15, 2000

SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court grants credit for 155 days time served. The Court
recommends defendant receive anger management therapy at the
prison.

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
The amount of Restitution is still to be determined.
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Pay restitution of all medical and counseling expenses incurred by
the victim(s) in an amount to be determined by Adult Probation and
Parole.
Dated this

^ d a y of
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. J\_00

Page 2 (last)
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH RULES OP CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment.
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two
nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance.
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of
punishment, OT to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed.
The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any
information material to the imposition of sentence.
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's
absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a
defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant for defendant's arrest may be
issued by the court.
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed.
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or
prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it with
the court.
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an
illegal manner, at any time.
(0 Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose
sentence in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court
retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender committed to the Department
of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-202(l)(b), the court
shall so specify in the sentencing order.
(Amended effective January 1, 1995; January 1, 1996.)

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment*]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

ARTICLE VI
[MISCELLANEOUS
PROVISIONS]
[Assumption of public debt — Supreme Law — Oath of office — Religious tests prohibited.]
[1.] All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under
this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
[2.] This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
[3.] The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members
of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or
Affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
required as a qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United
States.

